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Appellants/Cross-Appellees William C. Selvage and Wm. C. 
Selvage, Inc. (collectively "Selvage") submit this response to 
the Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants Sear-Brown Associates, 
P.C. and The Sear-Brown Group, Inc. (collectively "Sear-Brown"). 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE CONCERNING CROSS-APPEAL 
I. Course of Proceedings. 
The trial court directed verdict against defendant J.J. 
Johnson & Associates ("Johnson") on Selvage's breach of contract 
claims. Instruction No. 22 at R.800. The jury's answers to 
Special Interrogatories found that Sear-Brown was also liable to 
Selvage on four independent bases under Utah's Fraudulent 
Transfers Act and the "mere instrumentality" doctrine. R.819-
827. 
After trial, Selvage and Sear-Brown submitted, briefed and 
argued proposed findings and conclusions. The lower court's 
January 13, 1994 Memorandum Decision (i) specifically adopted the 
jury's findings as its own, (ii) concluded that Selvage is 
entitled to judgment against Sear-Brown on four independent 
grounds of fraudulent transfer and mere instrumentality, and 
(iii) awarded Selvage $42,500 in attorneys fees.i; R.1124-
1133A. 
Sear-Brown filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, For a New Trial and to Alter or Amend Judgment. R.113 8-
17
 This award of only 20% of Selvage's attorney's fees is the 
subject of Selvage's appeal. 
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1158. On April 14, 1994 the lower court entered its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, (i) incorporating its prior 
Memorandum Decision, (ii) specifically finding that there is 
sufficient evidence in the record to support each of the four 
bases of Sear-Brown's liability, (iii) ruling that Selvage's 
"insider" preference claim is not time-barred, and (iv) denying 
Sear-Brown's motions. R.1290-1294. 
On May 23, 1994 the lower court entered its Amended and 
Final Judgment in favor of Selvage and against both Sear Brown 
and Johnson in the principal amount of $109,400, plus prejudgment 
interest of $75,810.73, expenses of $6,433.87, and attorneys' 
fees of $42,500, for a total of $234,144.60. R.1396-1399. 
II. Statement of Facts Concerning Cross-Appeal. 
A. Defendant Johnson. Johnson purchased Selvage's 
architectural business. R.12. The sale occurred on August 28, 
1986 and consisted of three separate agreements (Exhibits 6, 7 
and 9). All three agreements provided for reasonable attorneys 
fees. 
Selvage commenced this action on April 7, 1987, alleging 
that Johnson breached all three contracts, and seeking damages, 
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. R.2-82. After four days 
of trial, the jury was directed that Johnson is liable under all 
s-\alr\56593 2 
three contracts.-7 R.800. The jury returned its verdict 
through answer to Special Interrogatory No. 1, finding Johnson 
liable to Selvage in the principal amount of $109,400.32. R.819. 
B. Defendant Sear-Brown. Sear-Brown is a national design, 
architectural and engineering firm, headquartered in Rochester, 
New York. R.1779, 1780. In late 1985 and early 1986, Sear-Brown 
commenced its relationship with Johnson. R.1781. At that time, 
Sear-Brown was aware that Johnson was in financial trouble. 
R.1785. On or about December 16, 1985 Sear-Brown "loaned" 
Johnson $365,000. R.1788. However, no security was given, no 
interest was charged, and no demand for payment was ever made. 
R. 1788, 1789; 1819. In conjunction with that "loan," Sear-Brown 
acquired 40% of the outstanding stock in Johnson. R.1788. On 
January 26, 1986 two of Sear-Brown's officers and directors 
joined Johnson's five member board. R.1790, 1791. 
On or about February 25, 1987, Sear-Brown acquired an 
additional 26.6% of Johnson's stock, thereby increasing Sear-
Brown's stock ownership to 66.6%. R.1796, 1797. This additional 
stock was purchased for $200,000. R.1796. Sear-Brown retained 
two seats on the Johnson board of directors that was reduced to a 
total of four. R.1797. By April 15, 1988, Sear-Brown officers 
and employees occupied three of the four Johnson board seats. 
-
;
 Sear-Brown did not contest the directed verdict against 
Johnson. Until the first morning of trial, however, Sear-Brown's 
attorneys also represented Johnson. 
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R.1803. At a Johnson board meeting on April 15, 1988, Mr. Jack 
Johnson, the founder and president of Johnson company, was fired 
by the Sear-Brown-controlled board. R.1803, 1804,. 
Mr. Johnson's termination was shortly followed by a lawsuit 
by Mr. Johnson against Sear-Brown, and two lawsuits by Sear-Brown 
and the Johnson company against Mr. Johnson and his wife. 
R.1806; Exhibit 76. 
On September 30, 1988 Sear-Brown entered into an agreement 
settling the pending litigation with Jack Johnson and his wife, 
Gloria. R.1808; Exhibit 76. That settlement agreement: 
(1) dismissed the pending lawsuits between Mr. & Mrs. 
Johnson, the Johnson company and Sear-Brown; 
(2) conveyed the remaining Johnson company stock to Sear-
Brown, thereby vesting 100% of the Johnson stock in Sear-Brown; 
(3) obligated Mr. & Mrs. Johnson to pay Sear-Brown the sum 
of $230,000; and 
(4) permitted Sear-Brown to use the Johnson name until 
December 31, 1988. R.1809; Exhibit 76. 
The $230,000 was actually owed by Mr. & Mrs. Johnson to the 
Johnson company, not to Sear-Brown. Mr. Johnson's payment to 
Sear-Brown of that $230,000 was therefore a transfer of a Johnson 
company's corporate asset to Sear-Brown. R.1810. 
As of September 30, 1988 Johnson's liabilities exceeded its 
assets by approximately one-half million dollars. R.1816, 1817; 
1887, 1888. On October 1, 1988 Johnson, the company, ceased 
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operation. Exhibit 67. Johnson no longer had any employees. 
R.2192. Commencing on October 1, 1988 and through February, 
1989, all of Johnson's assets were transferred to Sear-Brown, 
down to the last paper clip. R.1814, 1815, 1829. Those 
transfers were directed by Johnson's board of directors which 
consisted entirely of officers or employees of Sear-Brown. 
R.1868, 1869, 1878, 1879, 1885; Exhibit WW. The transferred 
assets included Johnson's personal property, accounts receivable 
of $442,765.95, clients, and work in progress. R.1820-1823; 
Exhibit 60. 
Mr. Clary, Sear-Brown's president and a member of Johnson's 
board, referred to the transfer of assets as an "acquisition by 
default." R.1881. As early as January 1989, Sear-Brown's 
stationary had a return address "Sear-Brown Group Resort Design 
Division, formerly J.J. Johnson & Associates." Exhibit 78. Mr. 
Clary admitted previously describing the relationship as one of 
"merger," (R.1827), although he declined to do so at trial. 
R.1881. 
The transfers included Johnson's assets and liabilities. 
R.1885. According to Sear-Brown, it was owed some $797,000 by 
Johnson as of September 30, 1988. R.1890; Exhibit 55. Some 
$415,000 of the debt owed by Johnson to Sear-Brown was settled by 
the transfer of assets. R.1891, 1892; Exhibit 55. Johnson's 
"bad" accounts receivable that had previously been written off in 
the amount of $364,000 were reinstated as income on Johnson's 
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book (no cash was transferred), and transferred to Sear-Brown so 
that Sear-Brown could take the loss. R.1892; Exhibit 55. 
No value was assigned by Sear-Brown to the client base or 
work-in-progress it received from Johnson. R.1913. There was no 
attempt made to value the ongoing business of Johnson (R.1913), 
even though Sear-Brown originally came to Utah to get into the 
resort design business. R.1718. Sear-Brown is still in the 
resort design business in Salt Lake. R.1913. 
The $230,000 paid by Mr. & Mrs. Johnson under the 
litigation settlement was paid directly to Sear-Brown instead of 
through the Johnson company. R.1905. That $230,000 payment went 
toward recoupment of Sear-Brown's equity investment in the 
Johnson company, not toward payment of any indebtedness. R.1906. 
After the transfers to Sear-Brown and resolution of other 
Johnson liabilities, the only liabilities left with Johnson were 
those owed to Selvage. R.1830, 1898, 1899. On July 6, 1990, 
Sear-Brown placed Johnson into bankruptcy. R.1828; Exhibit 67. 
Johnson's Chapter 7 filing showed no ($0.00) assets, and listed 
$332,000 in contingent liabilities owing to Selvage. R.1828, 
1832; Exhibit 67. In response to a bankruptcy petition question 
regarding payments to "relatives" during the year preceding the 
filing, Johnson responded "None." R.2175, 2176; Exhibit 67. 
Sear-Brown paid the costs and fees associated with Johnson's 
bankruptcy (R.1828), and specifically timed the bankruptcy 
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petition take advantage of statutes of limitations for avoiding 
transfers. R.1878, 2182 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Sear-Brown admits that, unless a statute of limitation 
bars Selvage's claim based upon "insider" transfers, it is liable 
to Selvage. Selvage's claim is not time-barred for the following 
reasons: 
a. Sear-Brown did not properly plead the statute of 
limitations defense; 
b. Sear-Brown cannot cure its failure to properly 
plead by asserting that this is a jurisdictional issue; 
c. Sear-Brown's last minute motion for summary 
judgment did not cure its failure to plead the statute of 
limitations; 
d. Even if the statute of limitations was properly 
pleaded, application of the discovery rule bars its 
application; 
e. The asserted statute of limitations is not a 
statute of repose and, even if it was, it is still subject 
to the discovery rule. 
2. The appellant must marshal the evidence supporting the 
findings in order to demonstrate that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient. Sear-
Brown failed to marshal the evidence pertaining to the time 
period during which the transfers from Johnson to Sear-Brown were 
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made. On this basis alone, Sear-Brown's appeal should be 
dismissed. 
3. The evidence fully supports the jury's answers to 
special interrogatories, and the lower court's findings, that 
Johnson and Sear-Brown had the requisite intent to hinder, delay 
or defraud Selvage. Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5 is not simply a 
restatement of common law fraud. The jury was properly 
instructed as to the statutory "factors" that may be considered. 
Of particular relevance (not marshalled in Sear-Brown's brief) 
was the transfer of $230,000 of Johnson assets on account of 
Sear-Brown's stock interest in Johnson. 
4. The jury in this case was properly instructed. Any 
error in the instructions was immaterial and harmless because the 
lower court adopted the jury's findings as its own. 
5. The doctrine of "mere instrumentality" is a basis for 
holding one corporation liable for the debts of another 
corporation that it totally controls and strips of assets to the 
detriment of a creditor. Selvage suffered such a loss and injury 
due to Johnson's transfer of all its assets to Sear-Brown. The 
lead case of Turner from the Seventh Circuit has been cited with 
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Omnico. 
6. Selvage is entitled to all his attorneys fees from 
Sear-Brown under both the doctrine of mere instrumentality and 
Utah's Fraudulent Transfers Act. No allocation of fees was 
required by failure of the alter ego theory because it did not 
s.\alr\56593 8 
affect Selvage's presentation of evidence, right to judgment, or 
amount of judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SELVAGE'S "INSIDER TRANSFER" CLAIM WAS NOT TIME-BARRED AND 
SEAR-BROWN ADMITS LIABILITY ON THE MERITS. 
Appellant Sear-Brown does not dispute the merits of 
Selvage's insider transfer claim under Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-
6(2).-7 Sear-Brown argues that this claim was time-barred under 
§ 25-6-10(3). The trial court, however, properly sustained 
Selvage's claim by invoking the judicial discovery rules set 
forth in Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990). 
Sear-Brown does not contend Selvage failed to actually 
satisfy the Klinger tests. Sear-Brown's sole appeal is the 
erroneous blanket contention that Klinger's judicial discovery 
rules can never be applied in any case to extend § 25-6-10(3). 
As set forth herein, Klinger can be applied in an appropriate 
insider transfer case, so Selvage's judgment must be affirmed. 
Before turning to the discovery rule, however, Selvage's 
judgment must be affirmed because Sear-Brown never pleaded § 25-
6-10(3) under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) A1 
* Sear-Brown Brief at 18: "It is undisputed that Johnson 
Associate's transfers to Sear-Brown in partial satisfaction of 
antecedent debts met the elements of insider transfers under Utah 
Code Ann. § 25-6-6 (2) . •• 
y Because the trial court applied the discovery rule, it never 
reached Selvage's argument under Rule 9(h). See R.00828. 
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A. Section § 25-6-10(3) Was Never Pleaded Under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 9(h). 
Sear-Brown's Answer only generally alleged that 
"Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations." The Answer never identified § 25-6-10(3), or any 
other governing statute, and never indicated which of Selvage's 
multiple claims were allegedly affected. Rule 9(h) expressly 
required Sear-Brown to plead its statute of limitations defense 
by: 
... referring to or describing such statute 
specifically and definitely by section number, 
subsection designation, if any, or otherwise 
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently 
clearly to identify it. 
A century of rulings by the Supreme Court under Rule 9(h) and its 
predecessors hold that Sear-Brown's failure to specify § 25-6-
10(3) waived the benefit of that affirmative defense. E.g., 
Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007, 1010-11 & n.5 
(Utah 1970) .^ 
1. Rule 9(h) Controls, Even If § 25-6-10(3) Is A 
Statute of Repose. 
Historical examination precludes Sear-Brown's contention 
that Rule 9(h)'s reference to "statute of limitations" excludes 
& American Theatre Co. v. Glassman, 80 P.2d 922, 923-34 (Utah 
1938)(pleading identified wrong statute, so defense was unavailable 
in fraudulent conveyance action) ; In re Lindford's Estate, 207 P. 2d 
1033, 1034 (Utah 1949) (general allegation insufficient); Nelden-
Judsen Drug Co. v. Commercial National Bank of Ogden, 74 Pac. 195 
(Utah 1903) ; Spanish Fork City v. Hopper, 26 Pac. 293 (Utah 1891) . 
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statutes of repose.-7 Rule 9(h) was adopted in 1950, and 
restates more than a century of Utah law. E.g., Compiled Laws of 
Utah § 3244 (1888). In contrast, the Supreme Court's express 
distinction between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation 
apparently originated in 1985 with Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) .1J As recently as 
1S84, the Supreme Court used "statute of limitation" and "statute 
of repose" interchangeably. E.g., Compare Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216, 219 (Utah 
1984)(referring to § 70A-2-725 both as a statute of limitation 
and as a statute of repose) with Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. 
Bonneville Investment, Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 13 n.2 (Utah 
1990)(carefully distinguishing § 70A-2-725 as a statute of 
repose, even though it is frequently called a statute of 
limitation) .-7 
- Section 25-6-10(3) is a statute of limitation, not repose, as 
set forth in Selvage's argument on the discovery rule. For 
purposes of Rule 9(h), however, the distinction is immaterial. 
1J
 Berry states that Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P. 2d 
30 (Utah 1981) and Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) 
reviewed statutes of "repose". 717 P.2d at 683. Neither of those 
cases, however, use the term "repose". 
y
 See also Peterson v. Callister, 313 P. 2d 814, 815 (Utah 
1957)(describing § 78-12-5.1 both as statute of limitation and as 
a statute of repose); Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223, 224 (Utah 
1974)(incorrectly referring to § 78-12-25.5 as a statute of 
limitation); Hirtler v. Hirtler, 566 P.2d 1231, 1231 (Utah 
1977) (describing § 78-12-23 both as a statute of limitation and as 
a statute of repose). 
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Similarly, the Utah Legislature has historically used 
"statutes of limitation" to refer to statutes of repose. E.g., 
former Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1), the quintessential statute of 
repose reviewed in Berry; title language in 1977 Utah Laws § 149; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (medical malpractice statute of repose 
entitled "statute of limitations"). The earliest instances 
located by Selvage of the Utah Legislature actually using the 
term "statute of repose" are the 1988 enactments of § 78-12-
33.5(1) and § 78-12-48(1) ("no statute of limitation or repose"). 
The foregoing historical background demonstrates that Rule 
9(h)'s 1950 language of "statute of limitations" did not 
distinguish between statutes of limitation and statutes of 
repose, and must be read broadly to include both. 
2. Sear-Brown Cannot Avoid Its Failure to Properly 
Plead by Characterizing § 25-6-10(3) as 
Jurisdictional 
Sear-Brown also contends that statutes of repose are 
jurisdictional, and therefore cannot be waived, regardless of 
Rule 9(h). No Utah case cited by Sear-Brown describes statutes 
of repose in terms of "subject matter jurisdiction."-7 
11
 Sear-Brown's only cases mentioning "jurisdiction" concern 
mechanics liens: AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. and Energy Co., 
714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) and Diehl Lumber Transp., Inc. v. 
Mickelson, 802 P.2d 739 (Utah App. 1990). See also Projects 
Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 751 n.13 
(Utah 1990) which ruled that § 38-1-11 is a substantive restriction 
on mechanics liens rather than a statute of limitations. Obviously, 
after a lien has expired, there is nothing left for a court to 
order foreclosed. None of these cases, however, describe § 38-1-11 
(continued...) 
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Accepting Sear-Brown's argument would allow any defendant to 
assert any statute of repose for the first time on appeal, 
thereby affecting such common litigation as sales disputes 
(§ 70A-2-725) and medical malpractice (§ 78-14-1). 
Nor does § 25-6-10 (3)'s language that "extinguishes" claims 
make it jurisdictional. Many affirmative defenses "extinguish" 
claims,—7 but they must still be properly pleaded under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 8(c)% Sear-Brown's argument would excise all affirmative 
defenses that "extinguish" claims from Rule 8(c) on 
"jurisdictional" grounds. Finally, Sear-Brown offers no policy 
why statutes of repose should be treated as jurisdictional and 
nonwaivable. 
3. Sear-Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment Did Not 
Cure Its Defective Answer. 
Sear-Brown argues that its motion for summary judgment, 
filed one week before trial and heard on the first day of trial, 
should be deemed to satisfy Rule 9(h). General notice of 
potential affirmative defenses on the eve of trial, however, does 
not satisfy Rule 8(c) or Rule 9(h). 
-''(... continued; 
as a statute of repose (or even mention statutes of repose) . Those 
cases are simply not probative of the issues in this appeal. 
w
 See, e.g., Robinson v. Hansen, 594 P.2d 867, 870 (Utah 
1979) (accord, "extinguishment"); State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 
492, 494 (Utah App. 1993)(payment, "extinguished"); Quealy v. 
Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah 1986) (releases and accords, 
"extinguish"). 
s:\alr\56593 13 
Sear Brown cannot take refuge in Utah R. Civ, P. 15(b) 
because it never moved to amend as that rule requires. Sear-
Brown failed to move to amend during the 7 months between 
Selvage's October 14, 1993 Memorandum raising Rule 9(h) (R.0828) 
and the May 23, 1994 Amended Final Judgment. Nor did Sear-Brown 
make a post-judgment motion as permitted by Rule 15(b). 
Any motion to amend under Rule 15 would have to have been 
denied anyway. Having delayed identifying which claim was 
affected by which statute until the eve of trial, and having 
admitted liability on the merits,—7 Sear-Brown could never 
satisfy Rule 15(b)'s requirement that the "merits of the action 
will be subserved thereby," or Rule 15 (a)'s condition of "when 
justice so requires." See Goeltz v. Continental Bank & Trust 
Co., 299 P.2d 832, 834-35 (Utah 1956); Staker v. Huntington 
Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). 
Sear-Brown's brief offers no reason to deviate from a 
century of precedent strictly enforcing Rule 9(h). Any complaint 
that Rule 9(h) is a technicality is overshadowed by Sear-Brown's 
admission of liability "but for" the technicality of § 25-6-
10(3)'s narrow one-year window. Under competing technicalities, 
the admitted merits must prevail. 
—'' During argument on directed verdict (R.01979) Sear-Brown's 
counsel stated: Section 25-6-10(3) "is one of the single most 
important issues in this case, because if the plaintiffs are 
permitted to go ahead under this status kind of claim, they, in 
essence, win." See also Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellant at 18. 
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B. The Trial Court Was Not Precluded From Applying the 
Discovery Rule. 
Even if Rule 9(h) is not dispositive, Sear-Brown's 
arguments that the discovery rule should never be applied to 
§ 25-6-10(3) are ill-founded. 
1* Statutory Construction of § 25-6-10 Does Not 
Preclude Use of Klinger's Judicial Discovery 
Rules. 
Section § 25-6-10 has three subsections setting limitations 
periods for different types of fraudulent transfers. Sear-Brown 
is correct that § 25-6-10(1)'s express discovery rule for "actual 
intent" cases precludes implying a statutory discovery rule for 
insider transfer cases under § 25-6-10(3). Sear-Brown's argument 
is an incomplete, however, because statutory provision is only 
one of three grounds in Klinger for invoking a discovery rule. 
Klinger also provides a judicial discovery rule if warranted by 
the particular facts of a specific case, i.e. where: (i) the 
defendant engaged in concealment or misleading conduct, or (ii) 
application of the general statute of limitation rule would be 
"irrational or unjust" while the equities and prejudice weigh in 
favor of the plaintiff. 791 P.2d at 872. See also Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Utah 1981). 
Because Sear-Brown's brief never challenges Selvage's 
satisfaction of Klinger's criteria for invoking those judicial 
discovery rules in this case, the judgment must be affirmed. 
Moreover, the policies behind statutes of limitation are not 
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violated in this case because Sear-Brown's open admission of 
liability on the merits resolves any issue of surprise or stale 
evidence. 
2. Sear-Brown's Characterization of § 25-6-10(3) As A 
Statute Of Repose Does Not Bar Application of 
Klinger' a Judicial Discovery Rules,, 
Sear-Brown argues (i) that § 25-6-10(3) is a statute of 
repose, and (ii) that any discovery rule is antithetical to a 
statute of repose. Failure of either argument requires 
affirmation of Selvage's judgment. 
a. Section 25-6-10(3) Is Not A Statute Of 
Repose. 
The distinguishing feature of a statute of repose is that 
it commences from a date or event independent of the date the 
legal injury occurs. In comparison, a statute of limitations 
runs from the date a cause of action arises. Berry ex rel. Berry 
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985); Raithaus 
v. Saab-Scandia of America, Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 
1989). 
Section 25-6-10(3)'s one-year period to file an insider 
transfer claim runs from the date property is transferred. A 
claim under § 25-6-6(2) accrues on that same date. The elements 
of an insider transfer claim are: (i) the plaintiff was a 
creditor "before the transfer" was made, (ii) the transferor "was 
insolvent at the time" of the transfer, (iii) the transfer 
satisfied an antecedent debt to the insider-transferee, and (iv) 
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the insider-transferee already "had reasonable cause to believe" 
the transferor was insolvent. Because § 25-6-6(2) and § 25-6-
10(3) are triggered simultaneously, § 25-6-10(3) operates as a 
statute of limitation, not as a statute of repose. Avis v. Board 
of Review of Industrial Comm., 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 
1992), cert, den., 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993) (§ 35-1-99 is a 
statute of limitation, not repose, because the limitation period 
begins when the claim arises). 
Sear-Brown wrongly reasons that § 25-6-10(3) is a statute 
of repose because it "extinguishes" claims and UFTA Comment 9 
says it is intended to "bar the right and not merely the remedy." 
Sear-Brown's brief ignores the remainder of UFTA's Comment 9 and 
UFTA's Prefatory Notes, however, which state that the legislation 
creates "statutes of limitation." 7A Uniform Laws Ann, Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, at pp. 642 and 666. 
No Utah case—7 makes the distinction that statutes of 
limitation "bar" remedies while statutes of repose "extinguish" 
claims. Berry uses the term "extinguish" to describe the 
**' Sear-Brown's citation to United States v. Vellalos, 780 F. 
Supp. 705 (D. Hawaii 1992) does not help its argument. First, the 
Vellalos court never refers to the Uniform Act as creating a 
statute of "repose". Second, to the extent the Vellalos court held 
the statute's "extinguished" language was legally significant, it 
also acknowledged it was diverging from rulings by the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits. Third, Vellalos specifically noted that "the 
United States does not claim that it could not have reasonably 
discovered this recorded conveyance" by the statute's expiration 
date, thereby suggesting that a judicial discovery rule could have 
applied under the Uniform Act if the facts of the case warranted. 
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practical effect of a statute of repose expiring before a claim 
arises, 717 P.2d at 684, but also states that the purpose of a 
statute of repose "is to bar injured plaintiffs7 judicial 
remedies." Id. at 673, Any difference between Extinguish" and 
"bar" is a red herring.—7 
b. Discovery Rules May Be Applied To Statutes Of 
Repose. 
Sear-Brown's argument that discovery rules are inherently 
antithetical to statutes of repose is erroneous. The Utah 
Legislature has determined that statutes of repose and discovery 
rules can coexist. E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 
(improvements to real property); § 78-12-48 (asbestos); § 78-14-
4(1)(a) (medical malpractice). Sear-Brown even contradicts 
itself by arguing that all of § 25-6-10 is a statute of repose, 
while pointing out that § 25-6-10(1) contains a discovery rule. 
Sear-Brown's argument that tolling provisions can never apply to 
statutes of repose is also belied by Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 
589 (Utah 1993) (" § 78-12-36 operates to toll ... the four-year 
statute of repose found in § 78-14-4(1)")(emphasis added); Berry, 
111 P.2d at n.9 (application of tolling provisions by Nebraska 
court to statute of repose). 
117
 Cf. Berry, 111 P. 2d at 679, wherein the Supreme Court rejected 
any constitutional significance of semantic distinctions between 
"abrogating" a claim and defining a claim to be "temporally 
limited." 
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The above examples illustrate that discovery rules and 
other tolling provisions can coexist with statutes of repose. In 
contrast, Sear-Brown offers no policy reason why Klinger should 
never apply to such statutes. Justice is obviously best served 
by a judicial discovery rule in cases of concealment or 
misleading conduct -- otherwise a statute of repose would 
sanction such misconduct. Similarly, no purpose is served by 
barring claims when application of the general statute would be 
"irrational or unjust" and admission of liability belies any 
surprise or evidentiary prejudice.—7 
Finally, Sear-Brown wrongly argues that Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 68-3-1 and 68-3-2 prevent a court from applying common law 
tolling principles to § 25-6-10(3). Section 25-6-11, however, 
expressly preserves and incorporates existing principles of law 
and equity not specifically displaced by the Act. E.g., UFTA's 
Comment 10 states that under § 25-6-11 laches may bar an 
otherwise timely claim. If § 25-6-11 is broad enough encompass 
laches, it is can also incorporate narrowly defined judicial 
discovery rules. Thus, even if judicial discovery rules are 
inapplicable to most statutes of repose, § 25-6-11 expressly 
preserves the courts' prerogative to apply Klinger, when 
~
7
 Sear-Brown also argues that applying judicial discovery rules 
would be improper because § 25-6-6(2) is merely a "status-based 
violation". That contention is erroneous because, in addition to 
status, the statute also requires that the insider transferee "had 
reasonable cause to the believe that the debtor was insolvent." 
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appropriate, to cases under § 25-6-10(3). Sear-Brown's appeal 
does not challenge Selvage's satisfaction of the Klinger 
criteria, so the judgment must be affirmed. 
II. SEAR-BROWN FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The "clearly erroneous" standard governs appellate review 
of the sufficiency of evidence supporting findings of fact. A 
finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Reinhold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 
487 (Utah App. 1993). The appellate court must review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings 
and affirm if there is a reasonable basis for doing so. Gillmore 
v. Gillmore, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1278 (Utah 1988). The appellant must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings in order to demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 
(Utah 1989). 
Sear-Brown's "heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence was 
recently examined by this Court in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage, 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994): 
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of 
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the [marshaling] duty ..., the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists." [citations omitted] 
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Once appellants have established every pillar 
supporting their adversary's position, they then "must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those 
pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. They 
must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous,'" 
[citation omitted] 
Id. at 1053. This Court concluded: 
This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that 
appellate courts "do not sit to retry cases submitted on 
disputed facts." [citation omitted] Accordingly, '[w]hen 
the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse 
to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and 
accept the findings as valid." [citation omitted] 
Id. 
Sear-Brown did not attempt to marshal the evidence. Sear-
Brown simply selected facts that support its position in an 
attempt to reargue the case before this Court. The most glaring 
failure in this respect is Sear-Brown's refusal to discuss the 
evidence of what occurred after September 30, 1988. Selvage's 
claims of fraudulent transfer and mere instrumentality did not 
arise until September 30, 1988 when Sear-Brown acquired total 
ownership and total control of Johnson, terminated Johnson's 
business, and transferred all of Johnson's assets. Selvage does 
not claim, and did not claim at trial, that Sear-Brown did 
anything improper before September 30, 1988. It was the evidence 
of events after that date that formed the basis and support of 
the jury's and lower court's findings and judgment. See 
discussion of this evidence under III. infra, at pp. 20-22; 27-
29; 31-32. 
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Sear-Brown's failure to marshal the evidence regarding the 
critical period after September 30, 1988, let alone portray it in 
the light most favorable to Selvage, dictates dismissal of Sear-
Brown's cross-appeal. 
III. THE FINDINGS THAT JOHNSON AND SEAR-BROWN ACTED WITH ACTUAL 
INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY OR DEFRAUD SELVAGE WERE FULLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, 
Sear-Brown's brief attacking the jury's verdict and the 
Court's findings rendered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-
5(1)(a) (hinder, delay or defraud) disregards both the law and 
the facts. In short, Sear-Brown argues that this section is 
nothing more than common law fraud. 
Section 25-6-5 provides in part as follows: 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is 
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim 
arose before or after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor, or .... 
The point of inquiry goes to the intent of the 
transferor.—7 This basis of liability is a creature of 
statute, not of the common law. Consequently, it does not 
require findings on the various elements of common law fraud. 
See Linden v. Lewis, Roca, et al,, 333 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1958). 
&' Johnson never appeared at trial to defend its intent. During 
the pertinent period from the transfers through the trial, Sear-
Brown controlled Johnson and could have caused Johnson to appear 
and defend its intent. Indeed, Johnson shared .Sear-Brown's counsel 
until the first day of trial. 
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The elements of § 25-6-5(1) (a) are simply a transfer and the 
proscribed intent. In addition, the statute states in the 
disjunctive the intent to hinder, delay, 2£ to defraud. Courts 
have recognized that each element of the hinder, delay or defraud 
clause may independently supply a creditor with the elements of a 
prima facie actual intent case. Merely stalling for time at the 
expense of one's creditors can violate the actual intent 
provisions. P. Alces, The Law of Fraudulent Transactions, 
1 5/03 [3] (1989) . 
Section 25-6-5(2) lists several factors, "among other 
factors," that may be considered when finding actual intent; 
whether, 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or 
concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was 
incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's 
assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the 
debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset 
transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent 
shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred. 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly 
after a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the 
business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an 
insider of the debtor. 
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In determining actual intent, it is not necessary that all 
or even most of these factors be present. See Dahnken, Inc. v. 
Wilmouth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). Obviously, based upon the 
language of 25-6-5(2), other factors may be taken into account by 
the fact finder as well. 
The jury was properly instructed regarding Section 25-6-
5(1)(a) and (2). Instruction 29 (R.807) was a virtual quote of 
the statute, including the listed nonexclusive factors. 
The jury was then requested to answer two special 
interrogatories, one going to actual intent to hinder or delay 
(Special Interrogatory No. 2; R.820), and one going to actual 
intent to defraud (Special Interrogatory No. 3; R.821). The 
unanimous jury answered both of these questions in the 
affirmative. 
As noted at the outset, Sear-Brown had a duty to marshal 
all the evidence going to these questions, but only identified 
selected portions.~7 That failure dictates a dismissal of its 
cross-appeal. However, without relieving Sear-Brown of its duty, 
and Selvage cites the following illustrative evidence before the 
jury: 
W Even the evidence identified in Sear-Brown's brief (pp. 28-31) 
support the verdict, although Sear-Brown attempts to downplay its 
significance. 
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1. The Transfer was to an Insider. At the time of the 
transfers, Sear-Brown owned 100% of the stock of Johnson. 
R.1809. 
2. The Transfer or Obligation was Disclosed or Concealed. 
Sear-Brown intentionally waited almost two years after the 
transfers before placing Johnson in bankruptcy. One of the 
express reasons for this delay was to avoid applicable statutes 
of limitation, including those of the Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
R.1828, 1875; 2172, 2182. The transfers were not disclosed in 
the bankruptcy schedules prepared for Johnson by attorney Curtis. 
R.1829; 2175, 2176; Exhibit 67. Sear-Brown paid Curtis's fees 
for preparing the schedules. R.1208-09; Exhibit 67. 
3. Before the Transfer was Made or Obligation Incurred, 
the Debtor Had Been Sued. Johnson was sued by Selvage in the 
spring of 1987. R.2-82. While the transfers were being made, 
i.e., November 4, 1988, Selvage obtained summary judgment against 
Johnson on the promissory note. R.145. 
4. The Transfer was of Substantially All of the Debtor's 
Assets. Between October 1, 1988 and February 17, 1989 all of 
Johnson's assets were transferred to Sear-Brown. R.1814, 1815. 
5. The Value of the Consideration Received by the Debtor 
was Not Reasonably Eguivalent to the Value of the Asset 
Transferred. The jury was presented with evidence that Johnson 
did not receive eguivalent value for its assets. Sear-Brown 
alleged a debt owed by Johnson of $797,000, and the transfer of 
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$415,000 in assets. However, $365,000 of this "debt" was 
accompanied by Sear-Brown's acquisition of 40% of Johnson's 
stock. The note supposedly reflecting this "loan" was never 
demanded, interest was never charged and security was never 
given. R.1788, 1789, 1819. The jury could infer that this was 
not a loan, but rather an acquisition of stock: it was pointed 
out that, two years later, Sear-Brown acquired another 26% of the 
stock for $200,000. R.1796, 1797. 
In addition, another $230,000 of the cash transferred to 
Sear-Brown was admittedly applied to retire stock and had 
absolutely nothing to do with repayment of debt. R.1905, 1906; 
Exhibit 55. At that time, § 16-10-42 (now repealed) provided 
that distribution of assets to shareholders was allowed, 
provided: "No such distribution shall be made at the time when 
the corporation is insolvent or when such distribution would 
render the corporation insolvent." The $23 0,000 transfer to 
Sear-Brown on account of a stock interest was, ipso facto, a 
fraudulent conveyance and probative evidence that all the 
transfers were made with proscribed intent. 
No value whatsoever was assigned by Sear-Brown to Johnson's 
transfer of its existing client base, bad receivables tax 
write-off, or ongoing business contracts: yet Sear-Brown 
admitted its motive was to continue Johnson's resort design 
business in Salt Lake City. R.1913, 1914. Accordingly, the jury 
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was entitled to disregard Sear-Brown's valuations and was 
justified in inferring intent to hinder, delay or defraud. 
6. The Debtor was Insolvent when the Transfers Occurred. 
At the time of the transfers, Johnson's liabilities exceeded its 
assets by the amount of $499,000. R.1887, 1888. 
Considering these few listed statutory factors alone, there 
is more than ample evidence of defendants' actual intent. There 
was substantial additional evidence of Johnson's intent to 
hinder, delay and defraud Selvage, not the least of which was 
Johnson's waiting almost six years before conceding its 
obligations to Selvage at trial, and paying all other creditors 
except Selvage. From at least October 1988 onward, Sear-Brown 
was in control of Johnson's efforts to avoid payment to Selvage. 
With or without viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Selvage, there is ample evidence of Johnson's intent 
to hinder, delay or defraud Selvage, as well as Sear-Brown's 
complicity. The record precludes overturning the jury's verdict 
and the trial court's independent finding. 
IV. INSTRUCTIONS 34 AND 35 WERE PROPER, OR HARMLESS ERROR. 
A. Sear-Brown's Objections To Jury Instructions Were Not 
Preserved. 
Sear-Brown placed certain objections to the jury 
instructions into the record (R.02060-61) shortly before the 
instructions were read to the jury, but neither the trial judge 
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nor Selvage's counsel was present.—7 Selvage was thereby 
deprived of the opportunity to address those objections. More 
importantly, the private oration neither requested the court, nor 
gave it any opportunity, to correct any perceived error before 
the jury retired to deliberate. Objections serve no purpose if 
not brought to the Court's attention, and are not for solely 
setting up an appeal. See Hill v. Cloward, 377 P.2d 186 (Utah 
1962) . 
In addition, the overly general and broad objections read 
into the record (R.02060) are inadequate to preserve the 
objections for appeal. Beehive Medical Electric, Inc. v. Square 
D Company, 669 P.2d 859 (Utah 1983). 
B. The Jury Was Correctly Instructed. 
Sear-Brown's brief (p.28 and pp. 2-3) erroneously 
challenges Instructions 34 and 35 with respect to finding actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. Instruction 35 
(R.816), however, was correctly taken from the Utah Corporations 
Code—7 which prohibits an insolvent corporation from 
distributing assets to its shareholders on account of their stock 
111
 The transcript (R.02059A-61) does not expressly reflect who 
was present. It does show, however, that the objections were not 
acknowledged by the judge or Selvage's counsel. Selvage does not 
expect Sear-Brown to deny that its objections were read to the 
reporter in private. Selvage's counsel did notice Sear-Brown's 
private statements to the reporter by chance, but only in time to 
hear the last few sentences. 
—
7
 Section 16-10-42, as effective on the date of the transfer, now 
repealed. 
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interests. That instruction of statutory law was specifically 
warranted by admissions in Sear-Brown's trial testimony that 
interests. That instruction of statutory law was specifically 
warranted by admissions in Sear-Brown's trial testimony that 
$230,000 of Johnson's assets were transferred on account of Sear-
Brown's "investment" and "not a repayment of debt." (Exhibit 55; 
R.01905-06, emphasis added). Sear-Brown's acceptance of 
transfers on account of its equity investment was significant 
evidence of actual intent to hinder and defraud, and was not a 
"mere preference." The jury could also infer that the $365,000 
unsecured, no interest, "loan" was actually equity. 
Similarly, Instruction 34 (R.815) states that the fiduciary 
duty of directors of an insolvent corporation shifts from the 
stockholders to creditors, and that the directors cannot prefer 
themselves or other creditors. Under the Corporations Code, the 
duty of the directors in distributing assets clearly shifts to 
creditors ahead of stockholders. With respect to preferring 
Sear-Brown as one creditor over Selvage, the transfer (on the 
date thereof) was specifically proscribed by Utah Code § 25-6-
6(2). Hence, Selvage's Proposed Additional Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order (R.01297) to the trial court stated: 
Under the Utah Corporations Code and the Utah 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, Instructions 34 and 35 were 
properly given in the context of this case. While Utah 
law does not per se prohibit preferential transfers, 
such transfers are avoidable when they violate the 
specific provisions of the Utah Corporation Code and 
the Fraudulent Conveyance [sic Transfer] Act. 
(Emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, the trial court issued it 
April 14, 1994 Findings and Conclusions (R.01293), agreeing that 
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"Instructions 34 and 35 were properly given in the context of 
this case." (Emphasis added). The trial court was correct. 
Even though general preferences to outside creditors may not be 
voidable, the jury wrestling with Sear-Brown's actual intent to 
hinder, delay or defraud Selvage was entitled to know that this 
particular transfer was statutorily proscribed on the date it was 
affected. Even if the preference claim under § 25-6-6(2) was 
time-barred, its statutory proscription at the time of transfer 
was material to the jury's determination of actual intent under 
§ 25-6-5(1) (a) . See also § 25-6-5(2) (a) . 
Moreover, Sear-Brown's brief omits the fact that 
Instruction No. 28 expressly instructed the jury that a transfer 
"is not fraudulent merely because the transferor prefers one 
creditor over another", and that Johnson's transfer to Sear-Brown 
"was not fraudulent merely because the company had insufficient 
assets to pay all creditors, including the plaintiffs." (R.806). 
Sear-Brown's suggestion that the jury ignored those express 
instructions is without foundation. The instructions must be 
read as a whole, and Sear-Brown's reference to Instruction Nos. 
34 and 35, without Instruction No. 28, misstates the record. 
C. Any Error In Instructions 34 and 35 Were Immaterial and 
Harmless. 
Ultimately, the judgment below was rendered on the findings 
and conclusions of the trial court, not on the jury's verdict. 
The January 13, 1994 Memorandum Decision stated, "The foregoing 
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Findings of Fact were triable by the jury. To the extent any of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact were issues for the court, the 
court adopts the findings of the jury as its own." 
(R.01130)(emphasis added). In a later hearing, the trial court 
described the jury in this case as "advisory."—7 
That ruling by the trial court itself, and the treatment of 
the jury as advisory, moots Sear-Brown's appeal on the jury 
instructions. Even if Instructions 34 or 35 could have confused 
a jury, prejudicial error does not occur when the jury is (or is 
treated as) advisory. Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1975). See a2so Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, 611 P.2d 
392 (Utah 1980). While Sear-Brown's brief (p.28) contends that a 
jury may have been confused by Instructions 34 and 35, Sear-Brown 
never attempts to argue that the trial court failed to keep 
separate its respective analyses of the insider preference claim 
and the claims for actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud. 
V. JOHNSON WAS THE MERE INSTRUMENTALITY OF SEAR-BROWN WHEN 
SEAR-BROWN STRIPPED JOHNSON OF ITS ASSETS. 
Sear-Brown is liable for Selvage's judgment and claims 
against Johnson because, at the time all the assets of Johnson 
were transferred to Sear-Brown, Johnson was a mere 
w
 Hearing of May 11, 1994 (R.02154-55). Selvage contends that 
all issues were triable by the jury because a money iudgment was 
sought, and briefed that issue to the trial court. (R.00875-880). 
Nevertheless, given the trial court's independent concurrence with 
the jury's findings in all respects, the proper role of the jury in 
this case is moot. 
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instrumentality of Sear Brown,. Steven v. Roscoe Turner 
Aeronautical Corp., 324 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1963), cited with 
approval by the Utah Supreme Court in Chatterly v. Omnico, 485 
P.2d 667, n.3 (Utah 1971). In Bernardin, Inc. v. Midland Oil 
Corp., 520 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1975), the court restated the 
well-established principle of law that "the parent corporation 
will be responsible for the obligations of its subsidiary 
when...the subsidiary has become its mere instrumentality." Id. 
To establish liability through the mere instrumentality 
theory, three elements must be proved. First, the parent must 
control the subsidiary "to such a degree that the subsidiary has 
become its mere instrumentality." Id. at 774. Second, the 
parent must have perpetrated a wrong through its subsidiary such 
as by "stripping the subsidiary of its assets." Id. Finally, 
there must be an element of "unjust loss or injury to the 
claimant, such as insolvency of the subsidiary." Id. See also 
Kelley v. American Precision Industries, Inc., 438 So.2d 29, 31 
(Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1983); CM Corp. v. Oberer Development Co., 631 
F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1980); Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Total 
Energy Leasing Corp., 502 F.Supp. 412, 416 (N.D. 111. 1980). 
The record fulfills each of those elements: Sear-Brown had 
total control of Johnson on the transfer dates, Sear-Brown 
committed a wrong by stripping Johnson of its assets, and that 
wrong unjustly injured Selvage because it left Johnson with no 
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assets and no ability to pay its liabilities to Selvage. These 
three elements will be discussed in detail. 
A. Control. Courts applying the mere instrumentality 
theory have listed several elements that indicate control of a 
subsidiary. The "proper combination" of these factors is 
controlling; each of them need not be met. Northern Illinois 
Gas, 502 F.Supp. at 419. As of the transfer dates, ten of the 
most relevant factors were clearly present:—7 
(1) "The parent corporation owns all or most of the capital 
stock of the subsidiary." Turner Aeronautical, 324 F.2d at 161. 
When Johnson's assets were transferred to Sear-Brown, Sear-Brown 
owned all of the stock of Johnson. 
(2) "The parent and subsidiary corporations have common 
directors or officers." Id. At the time of the transfer, all 
the directors of Johnson were agents of Sear-Brown. 
(3) "The parent corporation finances the subsidiary." Id. 
Sear-Brown had financed Johnson through a "loan," stock purchase, 
and settlement agreement. 
(4) "The parent corporation subscribes to all the capital 
stock of the subsidiary...." Id. At the time of the asset 
transfer, Sear-Brown owned all of Johnson's stock. 
^
7
 The factors indicating control are quoted here from Turner 
Aeronautical, 324 F.2d at 161. Turner Aeronautical's recitation of 
these factors has been generally adopted by courts considering this 
theory. See Bernardin, 520 F.2d at 775; OJberer Development, 631 
F.2d at 539. 
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(5) "The subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital." Id. 
From the moment of Sear-Brown's first involvement, Johnson was 
undercapitalized. Sear-Brown took all of Johnson's assets by 
assignment, leaving it without any capital at all, without any 
business operation, and ultimately in a liquidating Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. 
(6) "The parent corporation pays the salaries and other 
expenses or losses of the subsidiary." Id. During the transfer 
period all of Johnson's liabilities were paid, with the simple 
exception of the liabilities to Selvage. During the transfer 
period, Johnson had no employees. 
(7) "In the papers of the parent corporation or in the 
statements of its officers, the subsidiary is described as a 
department or division of the parent corporation, or its business 
or financial responsibilities referred to as the parent 
corporation's own." Id. Prior to the asset transfer, Sear-Brown 
told the media that the Sear-Brown Group, Inc.'s relationship 
with Johnson was one of "merger." In January 1989, Sear-Brown 
used letterhead describing itself "formerly J.J. Johnson and 
Associates." At trial, Sear-Brown's president described an 
"acquisition by default." 
(8) "The parent corporation uses the property of the 
subsidiary as its own." After September 30, 1988 Sear-Brown 
treated all of Johnson's assets as its own. 
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(9) "The directors or executives of the subsidiary do not 
act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but take 
their orders from the parent corporation in the latter's 
interest." Id. The directors and officers of Johnson acted in 
the interest of Sear-Brown rather than Johnson. Johnson's 
directors and officers stripped Johnson of all of its assets to 
pay Sear-Brown (some on account of stock rather than debt), 
waited a year to avoid preferential transfer liability, then put 
Johnson in Chapter 7. These actions of Johnson's officers and 
directors can hardly be characterized as "act[ing] independently 
in the interest of" Johnson. See id 
(10) "The formal legal requirements of the subsidiary 
are not observed." Id. Sear-Brown admitted taking some of the 
transfers on account of stock rather than debt. 
Those ten factors are manifestly sufficient to support the 
finding that, at the time of the asset transfers, Sear-Brown had 
complete control to the point that Johnson had become its mere 
instrumentality. See Northern Illinois Gas, 502 F.Supp. at 419 & 
n. 12 (not all factors need be present to support finding of 
control; nine out of eleven is sufficient); Bernardin, 520 F.2d 
at 775 (eight is enough). Thus, the first prong of the mere 
instrumentality theory was supported by the evidence in this 
case. 
B. Wrong by Stripping Assets. The second prong of the 
mere instrumentality theory is the presence of a "fraud or wrong 
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by the parent through its subsidiary, e.g., torts, violation of a 
statute or stripping the subsidiary of its assets." Turner 
Aeronautical, 324 F.2d at 160 (emphasis added). Obviously, this 
prong of the test is met in this case. By the time Sear-Brown 
was finished with Johnson, everything from work in progress to 
paper clips had been stripped clean. 
C. Unjust Loss or Injury. The final prong is "unjust loss 
or injury to the claimant, such as insolvency of the subsidiary." 
Id. (emphasis added). Johnson's insolvency is undisputed, and 
Johnson's bankruptcy petition listed its assets at zero. As part 
of the asset stripping, Sear-Brown received at least $230,00 on 
account of its stock investment. In contrast, Selvage as a 
creditor received nothing. 
The facts of this case squarely fit the legal requirements 
for the application of the mere instrumentality theory. At the 
time of the asset transfers which created the wrong (i.e., asset 
stripping), and during the bankruptcy which created the unjust 
loss to Selvage, Sear-Brown was in complete control of Johnson. 
In the factually similar case of Bernardin v. Midland Oil 
Corporation, 520 F.2d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 1975), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the following 
conclusion: 
The question then becomes, against whom should judgment be 
entered? Midland [the parent corporation] and Zestee [the 
subsidiary] are both corporations, but all of Zestee's 
stock is owned by Midland...The evidence introduced at the 
trial of this cause demonstrates that Zestee is no longer a 
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viable corporation. Midland, as the sole shareholder, 
directed one of its own officers to collect the insurance 
proceeds and sell the assets of Zestee. This was done, and 
the cash received on liquidation of the assets has been 
paid to other creditors. To permit Midland to escape 
Zestee's creditors by retaining Zestee as a shell would 
clearly be inequitable and unjust. Factors such as the 
stock ownership and the decision to liquidate and maintain 
a shell establish a situation where the corporate veil 
should be pierced...Therefore, the Court finds that Midland 
and Zestee are in essence one and the same, and that each 
[is] liable for the amount due Bemardin. 
Id. (quoting the opinion of the district court). 
That passage from Bemardin, with a few name changes, could 
have been written about the case before this Court. Sear-Brown, 
as the sole shareholder of Johnson, directed its officers, who 
also were officers of Johnson, to liquidate Johnson's assets and 
pay them to itself and to Johnson's other creditors with the sole 
exception of Selvage. This left Johnson as an empty, bankrupt 
shell from whom Selvage could get no satisfaction on his 
contractual claim or his judgment. Sear-Brown's "stock ownership 
[of Johnson] and the decision to liquidate and maintain a shell 
establish a situation where the corporate veil should be 
pierced." Id. Therefore, just as the Bemardin court found, the 
jury and trial court were justified by the evidence in finding 
Sear-Brown and Johnson were "in essence one and the same and that 
each [is] liable for the amount due" Selvage. Id. 
Sear-Brown argues that the jury's responses to Special 
Interrogatories Nos. 6 and 7 (R.824, 825) under Instruction 36 
(R.817) on alter ego somehow absolved it of liability under mere 
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instrumentality. Jury Instruction No. 33 (R.814) separately 
advised the jury of the mere instrumentality doctrine, and 
Special interrogatory No. 5 (R.823) separately asked the jury 
whether "at the time the assets were transferred" Johnson had 
become a mere instrumentality of Sear-Brown, whether Sear-Brown 
stripped Johnson of its assets, and whether this created an 
unjust loss or injury to Selvage. The unanimous jury said 
Unlike the mere instrumentality directions, the instruction 
and special interrogatory on alter ego did not direct the jury to 
"the time the assets were transferred, or, for that matter, to 
any time period." Rather blatantly, Sear-Brown's evidence and 
argument explicitly dealt only with the period before the 
transfers occurred. Perhaps the best example of this dichotomy 
was Sear-Brown's counsel's statement to Sear-Brown's president, 
Mr. Clary, while inquiring into the association between Johnson 
and Sear-Brown: 
—
7
 Although not addressed in Sear-Brown's brief, the jury reached 
its verdict in light of Instruction No. 32 (R.811) which required 
the jury to find "total domination" before it could find Sear-Brown 
liable under the mere instrumentality doctrine. Instruction No. 32 
specified facts which "standing alone" would not establish 
sufficient control. (See also Instruction No. 27, R.805). Thus, 
the jury was appropriately instructed. Moreover, at trial, Sear-
Brown objected to Instruction No. 33 on the basis that the mere 
instrumentality doctrine is not a basis for liability, Jbut Sear-
Brown did not object to kow Instructions Nos. 32 and 33 were worded 
and put to the jury. See R.2060. 
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Q. Prior to the time the assets were 
transferred ~- and all my questions are directed to 
this -- did Sear-Brown, for example, impose its 
vehicle policy on J.J. Johnson and Associates? 
(R.1873)(emphasis added). 
Later in the testimony, Sear-Brown's counsel inquired of 
Mr. Bruce Erickson as to his employment by Johnson. But again 
these questions only went through September 30, 1988, before any 
transfers occurred and before Sear-Brown had total control of 
Johnson. On cross-examination, Mr. Erickson admitted that during 
the period of transfers, he was an employee of Sear-Brown (rather 
than of Johnson). R.2192, 2193. 
Special Interrogatory No. 5 and Instruction No. 33 for the 
mere instrumentality theory on which Selvage prevailed were both 
expressly directed to the period when the transfers occurred. In 
contrast, neither Instruction No. 36 nor Special Interrogatories 
Nos. 6 or 7 on alter ego directed the jury to the period when the 
transfers occurred. Based on the different time periods and 
cases presented, the verdicts and court findings on alter ego and 
mere instrumentality were not inconsistent or contradictory. The 
jury and court found that during the pre-September 30, 1988 
period that Sear-Brown's counsel tried, Johnson was not Sear-
Brown's alter ego. Separately, the court and jury found that 
during the post-September 30, 1988 period that Selvage's counsel 
tried, Johnson was Sear-Brown's mere instrumentality. 
s:\alr\56593 39 
VI. SELVAGE IS ENTITLED TO ALL OF ITS ATTORNEYS FEES AGAINST 
SEAR-BROWN 
Sear-Brown's brief does not dispute the reasonableness or 
amount of Selvage's attorneys fees, but rather only challenges 
Selvage's entitlement to any attorneys fees. During seven and 
one-half years of litigation, Selvage incurred substantial legal 
fees in first pursuing breach of contract claims against J.J. 
Johnson, and then pursuing those same claims against Sear-Brown 
under mere instrumentality and fraudulent transfer. 
Pursuant to the three contracts that were conceded at trial 
to have been breached, Selvage is entitled to attorneys fees 
incurred in any action "brought for the enforcement of [the 
agreements], or because of an alleged dispute, breach, default or 
misrepresentation in connection with any of the provisions of the 
[the agreements]." Sear-Brown incorrectly argues that liability 
for fees is limited to Johnson on the contract claims and does 
not extend to Sear-Brown. 
Selvage is entitled to have his attorneys fees awarded 
against Sear-Brown, because: 
• Recovery under the mere instrumentality doctrine 
(Special Interrogatory No. 5) places Sear-Brown 
directly in Johnson's shoes. Sear-Brown therefore is 
directly and contractually liable for those fees. 
• Independently, Utah's Fraudulent Transfer Act, makes 
Sear-Brown statutorily liable for "the amount necessary 
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to satisfy the creditor's [Selvage's] claim11 against 
Johnson. Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(2) (emphasis 
added).—; Selvage's claim against Johnson includes 
his attorneys fees, and was less than the amount of the 
fraudulent transfers. See Id. Moreover, given 
Johnson's fraudulent transfers of all its assets, the 
costs of prosecuting the fraudulent transfer claim were 
"necessary to satisfy" Selvage's claim. 
In W. Marvin Radney, et al. v. Clean Lake Forest Community 
Association, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.App.Ct. 1984), the court 
awarded attorneys fees for both the underlying claim and 
establishing a fraudulent transfer. Radney involved a violation 
of a restrictive covenant for which a statute provided for 
attorneys fees. Just prior to trial, the defendant conveyed the 
subject property to a third party. The trial was continued to 
allow the plaintiffs to join the transferee of the property and 
— Counsel for Sear-Brown argued below that if the actions 
against Johnson and Sear-Brown had been separate, entitlement to 
attorneys fees would have been terminated at the conclusion of the 
case against Johnson. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Fees incurred in collection or satisfaction of a judgment are also 
recoverable. This is recognized not only by § 25-6-9(2), but also 
by Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration [attorneys' 
fees affidavits] which provides for the following language in 
default judgments: 
"And it is further ordered that this judgment shall be 
augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by 
execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit." 
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to state claims under the fraudulent conveyance act. The jury 
found that the conveyance was intended to "hinder or delay" 
plaintiffs from obtaining the requested relief. Attorneys fees 
were awarded against both the transferor and the transferee. 
On appeal, the defendants argued that plaintiffs had to 
distinguish between the attorneys fees incurred on the fraudulent 
conveyance cause of action and those incurred on the underlying 
action on the restrictive covenant. Rejecting this argument, the 
court ruled as follows: 
Appellants believe that, under the statute, appellees could 
not recover for legal services rendered in relation to the 
fraudulent conveyance cause of action. We disagree. 
The statute allows the recovery of attorney's fees in 
an action based on a restrictive covenant. We believe that 
the fraudulent conveyance action was in part based on and 
related to the breach of the restrictive covenant. The 
home had been conveyed by appellants, shortly prior to 
trial, to a foreign corporation. In order to obtain the 
complete relief to which they were entitled because of the 
breach, it was necessary for appellees to have the 
fraudulent conveyance voided. The fraudulent conveyance 
action would not have been necessary if appellants had not 
conveyed the property in order to avoid the suit to enforce 
the restriction. In this situation, the entire suit was 
based on the breach of the restriction. 
681 S.W.2d at p. 199 (emphasis added). 
Sear-Brown's citation to Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 
P.2d 266 (Utah 1992) is not to the contrary. Cottonwood Mall 
stands only for the proposition that a request for fees must 
distinguish between work that was subject to a fee award and work 
that was not: 
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"One who seeks an award of attorney fees must set out the 
time and fees expended for (1) successful claims for which 
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) 
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an 
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no 
entitlement to attorney fees." 
at. p._269, 270. Cottonwood Mall does not address whether fees 
incurred in avoiding a fraudulent transfer in satisfying a breach 
of contract claim are recoverable. Thus, there is simply no 
inconsistency between Radney and Cottonwood Mall. Radney 
addresses the question of what fees are recoverable; Cot tonwood 
Mall addresses the question of allocation if. it has already been 
determined that all fees are not recoverable. 
After trial, both the jury and the court found for Selvage 
on every theory except alter ego. (Unconscionability was 
originally pleaded but not litigated.) That unsuccessful alter 
ego theory, however, involved the same operative facts, evidence 
and damages that were actually awarded under the successful 
theories of mere instrumentality and fraudulent transfer. Hence, 
failure of the alter ego theory did not require allocation of 
fees as contended by Sear-Brown because it did not affect the 
presentation of Selvage's case, Selvage's right to judgment, or 
the amount of judgment. Furthermore, to the extent the jury did 
not award one item of damage that was claimed under all of his 
theories (compare Instruction No. 26, R.804 with Interrogatory 
No. 1, R.819), Selvage offered to put on testimony for any needed 
allocation. The trial court, however, ruled without granting the 
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requested hearing. (The effort to claim that single damage item 
represented less than l/10th of 1% of the fees incurred.) 
Selvage's request-for, and right to, that hearing are discussed 
in his opening brief. 
Sear-Brown speculates that the trial court cached the 
grossly reduced fee award of $42,500 by estimating the amount 
expended by Selvage on the contract claim alone. That 
speculation, however, does violence to the actual judgment that 
both Johnson and Sear-Brown are liable for the $42,500 fee award. 
Particularly in light of the trial court's failure to enter 
findings and conclusions on the fee award, the only reasonable 
interpretation of the trial court's rulings is that Selvage's 
$175,000.00 fee request was slashed to $42,500 for unexplained 
reasons. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 
1210 (Utah App. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 830 P.2d 252 
(Utah 1992) same counsel; same judge; same reduction). 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Sear-Brown's cross-appeal on liability should be dismissed. 
The attorneys fee portion of the judgment should be remanded in 
the manner requested in Selvage's opening brief. 
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ADDENDUM 
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Tab A 
Rule 9. Pleading special matters 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute 
of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts 
showing the defense but it may be alleged generally 
that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of 
the statute relied on, referring to or describing such 
statute specifically and definitely by section number, 
subsection designation, if any, or otherwise designat-
ing the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to 
identify it. If such allegation is controverted, the 
party pleading the statute must establish, on the 
trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is so 
barred. 
TabB 
Jury Instruction 2Z* 
The jury is instructed that defendant J. J. Johnson & 
Associates failed to appear in this lawsuit and failed to mount a 
defense in this lawsuit. The court, therefore, directs that 
defendant J. J. Johnson & Associates is liable to plaintiffs for 
breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement, Independent Consulting 
Areement, and the Addendum to the Independent Consulting 
Agreement. It is, however, within the province of the jury to 
determine the amount of damages to be awarded plaintiffs arising 
from defendant J. J. Johnson & Associates breach of those 
agreements. 
The court also wishes to inform the jury that counsel 
for Sear-Brown did not represent J. J. Johnson & Associates in 
this lawsuit and is in no way responsible for the court's entry 
of a directed verdict as to J. J. Johnson £ Associates liability 
for the breach of the agreements. 
00800 
Jury Instruction 2<b 
The plaintiffs claim that as a result of the 
defendants' failure to perform the defendants obligation under 
the contract, the plaintiffs suffered loss in one or more of the 
following respects: 
UNPAID TIME AND EXPENSES UP TO FEB. 1, 1987 $22,015.82 
ADDITIONAL UNPAID REIMBURSEABLES / COSTS 
AFTER FEB.l, 1987 $ 1,865.50 
BALANCE OF UNPAID CONSULTING AGREEMENT: 
CONSULTING SERVICES $37,500.00 
FIVE MONTHS RENT $ 2,500.00 
FIVE MONTHS OFFICE EXPENSES $ 2,500.00 
SIX MONTHS MED. INSURANCE $ 1,500.00 
UNPAID ASSET PURCHASE NOTE $25,000.00 
UNREIMBURSED AUGUST EXPENSES $ 9,650.00 
LOSS ON SALE OF IBM STOCK $22,500.00 
TAXES ON STOCK "GAIN" $ 7,000.00 
TOTAL $132,031.32 
00804 
11 
Jury Instruction *~' 
The degree to which a parent owns stock in its 
subsidiary or shares officers or directors with it, or files a 
joint tax return, or loans money to the subsidiary do not, in and 
of themselves, defeat the separate existence of the corporations 
so as to allow a parent corporation to be held liable for the 
debts of a subsidiary. 
00805 
Jury Instruction 
A transfer of property is not fraudulent merely because 
the transferor prefers one creditor over another. In this case, 
the transfer of J. J. Johnson & Associate's assets to the Sear-
Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates was not fraudulent 
merely because the company had insufficient assets to pay all 
creditors, including the plaintiffs. It is not the intent of the 
fraudulent transfer laws to provide equal distribution of the 
assets to creditors nor to compel a debtor to choose among its 
creditors. 
This general rule does not apply, however, if the 
transfer was a fraudulent transfer. 
0080G 
Jury Instruction 2q 
Under the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a 
transfer of assets from a debtor corporation is fraudulent if it 
is shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the transfer 
was made with actual intent to hinder or delay any creditor of 
the debtor corporation, or when it is shown by clear and 
convincing evidence that the transfer was made with actual intent 
to defraud any creditor of the debtor corporation. 
_To ^ determine whether the transfer was made with "actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud," consideration may be given, 
among other factors, to whether: 
A. the transfer was to an insider (for purposes of 
;S the Utah Fradulent Transfer Act, the term 
"insider" includes any shareholder who owns 2 0% or 
more of the outstanding voting securities of the 
debtor, or a corporation in control of the 
debtor); 
B. the debtor retained possession or control of the 
property transferred after the transfer; 
V 
/ concealed; 
the transfer or obligation was disclosed or 
y--\ D. before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened 
with suit; 
\/-\ E. the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's 
assets; 
F. the debtor absconded; 
? G. the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
H. the value of the consideration received by the 
"^  debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of 
the asset transferred or the amount of the 
obligation incurred; 
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^ 
I. the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent 
shortly after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred; 
^ ' M 
J. the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly 
c after a substantial debt was incurred; and 
K. the debtor transferred the essential assets of the 
\
 ; business to a lienor who transferred the assets to 
tv* an insider of the debtor. 
Not all of these factors need to be present to prove 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. These factors are 
only guidelines, and you may consider other factors present in 
the case. 
CC8C8 
Jury Instruction 31/ 
Under the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a 
transfer of assets from a debtor corporation is fraudulent if it 
is shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: 
- the assets were transferred to an insider for the 
purpose of satisfying a debt which the debtor owed to the insider 
(for purposes of the Utah Fradulent Transfer Act, the term 
"insider" includes any shareholder who owns 20% or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, or a corporation in 
control of the debtor corporation); 
- and that, at the time the assets were transferred, 
the debtor was insolvent; 
- and that the insider reasonable cause to believe that 
the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 
For purposes of this instruction, a debtor is 
"insolvent" if, at the time of the transfer, the debtor's 
liabilities exceeded its assets. 
00809 
Jury Instruction 
If a transfer is found to be fraudulent under the Utah 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the plaintiff may recover 
damages from the transferree up to the amount of the value of the 
assets which were transferred. 
For purposes of setting a value on the assets that were 
transferred, you may include the transferor's physical assets, 
cash, work in progress, accounts receivable, good will, and 
client lists. 
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Jury Instruction 
Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group may be 
held liable for the debts of J. J, Johnson & Associates, if you 
find that it misused J. J. Johnson & Associates by treating it, 
and by using it, as a mere business conduit for its own purposes. 
In making the determination of whether Sear-Brown Associates 
and/or Sear-Brown Group are liable to the plaintiff, you must 
consider two elements. 
First, did Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown 
Group control J. J. Johnson & Associates to the degree necessary 
to make J. J. Johnson & Associates a mere instrumentality as 
defined in these instructions, and 
Second, Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group 
must have proximately caused plaintiff harm through misuse of 
that control. 
The fact that Metro Equipment held an ownership 
interest in J. J. Johnson & Associates does not, standing alone, 
resolve the question of whether Sear-Brown Associates and/or 
Sear-Brown Group had control of J. J. Johnson & Associates. 
Similarly, the fact that a creditor/debtor relationship 
existed between J. J. Johnson & Associates and Metro Equipment 
and Sear-Brown Associates does not, standing alone, constitute 
control necessary to establish liability. 
Generally, the mere loan of money from one corporation 
to another does not automatically make the lender liable for 
actions and omissions of the borr^w^r. 
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In order for Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown 
Group to be liable for the debts or obligations of J. J. Johnson 
& Associates, you must find proof that Sear-Brown Associates 
and/or Sear-Brown Group assumed actual, participatory, total 
control of J. J, Johnson & Associates; its merely taking an 
active part in the management of J, J. Johnson & Associates does 
not automatically constitute such control. 
The degree of control required before Sear-Brown 
Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group can be found liable for the 
debts or obligations of J. J. Johnson & Associates amounts to 
total domination of J. J. Johnson & Associates, to the extent 
that J. J. Johnson & Associates manifests no separate corporate 
interest of its own and functioned solely to achieve the purposes 
of Sear-Brown Associates and/or Sear-Brown Group. 
nnfii 9 
-2 ~' 
Jury Instruction ^ 
A successor corporation is liable for the debts and 
obligations of a predecessor corporation if it is shown, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the predecessor corporation 
was a "mere instrumentality" of the successor corporation and 
that the successor stripped the predecessor of its assets, 
causing an unjust injury or loss to the plaintiff. 
A predecessor corporation is the "mere instrumentality" 
of the successor if it is shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, at the time of the asset transfer, that most, but 
not all, of the following factors were present: 
A. That the successor corporation owned all or most 
of the capital stock of the predecessor 
corporation; /-c-
B. That the two corporations had common directors or 
officers; ^c^u. 
C. That the successor corporation financed the 
predecessor corporation; M,^ 
D. That the parent corporation subscribed to all the 
capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise 
caused its incorporation; ~pt j 
,/ 
E. That the predecessor corporation had grossly 
inadequate capital so that it was unable to 
continue operation;/^c^ 
' / 
P. That the successor corporation paid the salaries 
and other expenses or losses of the predecessor 
corporation; ^ ^ 
G. That in the statements and writings of the 
successor corporation's officers, the predecessor 
corporation was described as a department or 
division of the successor corporation or the 
predecessor corporation's business or financial 
responsibilities were referred to as belonging to 
the successor; /! 
'
w
 C 
That the successor used the property of the 
predecessor as its own; Bcad,xJl^ 
That the executives of the predecessor did not act 
independently rr\ Thr iniiapnndenH-y in the interest 
of the predecessor, but rather took their orders 
from the successor, ^^i/^ 
J.J. Johnson had substantially no business except 
with the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown 
Associates or no assets except those conveyed to 
it by the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown 
Associates, JJ 
n n o i A 
Jury Instruction -* ' 
When a corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary 
duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the 
creditors of the corporation. When a corporation becomes 
insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers and directors 
no longer represent the stockholders, but by the fact of 
insolvency, become trustees for the creditors. The officers and 
directors of the insolvent corporation cannot by transfer of the 
corporation's property prefer themselves or other creditors. 
nno % e: 
Jury Instruction 
A corporation may not distribute all or a portion of 
its assets to shareholders, on account of their stock interests, 
if the corporation (i) is then insolvent, or (ii) would thereby 
be rendered insolvent. 
A corporation's distribution of assets to shareholders 
on account of their stock interest during insolvency is a 
fraudulent transfer. 
nnfiifi 
Jury Instruction 
Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate and 
distinct entity from its stockholders. This is true whether the 
corporation has many stockholders or only one. Consequently, the 
corporate veil which protects stockholders from liability for 
corporate debt will only be pierced reluctantly and cautiously. 
To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable 
"alter ego" doctrine, two circumstances must be shown: 
1. Such a unity of interest and ownership that 
the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
shareholder(s) no longer exists, but the corporation 
is, instead, the alter ego of its stockholder(s); and 
2. If observed, the corporate form would sanction 
a fraud, promote injustice, or result in an 
inequity. 
The plaintiff need not prove actual fraud, but must only show 
that failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in an 
injustice. 
Certain factors are deemed significant, but not 
conclusive, in determining whether the foregoing test has been 
met, including: 
a. undercapitalization of a one-man corporation, 
b. failure to observe corporate formalities, 
c. nonpayment of dividends, 
d. siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant 
shareholder, 
e. nonfunctioning of other officers or directors, 
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f. the use of the corporation as a facade for 
operations of the dominant stockholder or 
stockholders, 
g. the use of the corporate entity in promoting 
injustice or fraud. 
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F!LErPSVR5CTC05JRT 
TrjtrcJ Judicial District 
OCT 0 8 1993 
Special Interrogatory 
By. 
Li vAlt&CUui 
Opfijt" C»r* 
Indicate the amounts, if any, of damages you find 
plaintiffs incurred as a result of J. J. Johnson & Associates' 
breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement, the Independent 
Consulting Agreement and its Addendum. 
A. UNPAID TIME AND EXPENSES UP TO FEB. 1, 1987: $ $2 C/S~ - # <L 
B. ADDITIONAL UNPAID REIMBURSEABLES &. COSTS 
AFTER FEB. 1, 1987 
C. BALANCE OF UNPAID CONSULTING AGREEMENT: 
CONSULTING SERVICES 
FIVE MONTHS RENT 
FIVE MONTHS OFFICE EXPENSES 
SIX MONTHS MED. INSURANCE 
D.^ UNPAID ASSET PURCHASE NOTE 
\ 
E. UNREIMBURSED AUGUST EXPENSES 
F. LOSS ON SALE OF IBM STOCK 
G. TAXES ON STOCK "GAIN" 
$JM£-I-£L 
$ /Tcr rr^ 
$ <7£5T rr 
$ / ^ X . tor-
TOTAL DAMAGES: 
A'I 
DATED this S day of October, 1993. 
$ lf<?</r<T. J£ 
wfr<fr<A f^V^. 7^ Foreperson 
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Special Interrogatory 
Was it shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
the transfer of J. J. Johnson & Associates' assets to Sear-Brown 
was made with actual intent to hinder or delay any creditor of J. 
J- Johnson & Associates? 
Yes A 
No 
DATED this %t,f day of October, 1993 
^Foreperson 
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Special Interrogatory 
Was it shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
the transfer of J.J. Johnson & Associates' assets to Sear-Brown 
was made with actual intent to defraud any creditor of J.J. 
Johnson & Associates? 
Yes x 
No 
8* DATED this C~~ day of October, 1993 
Foreperson 
Special Interrogatory iL 
Was it shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
- the transfer of J. J. Johnson & Associates, Inc.'s 
assets to Sear-Brown was made for the purpose of satisfying a 
debt which J. J. Johnson & Associates, Inc. owed to Sear-Brown; 
-and, at the time the assets were transferred, Sear-
Brown was an insider of J.J. Johnson & Associates, Inc., 
- and, at the time the assets were transferred, J. J. 
Johnson & Associates, Inc. was insolvent (its liabilities exceed 
its assets); 
- and, that Sear-Brown had reason to believe that J. J. 
Johnson & Associates, Inc. was insolvent at the time of the 
transfer? 
Yes 
No 
A 
DATED this <^' day of October, 1993 
"Foreperson 
Special Interrogatory 
Was it shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the following factors were present? 
1. That at the time the assets were transferred, 
Sear-Brown controlled J.J. Johnson & Associates, 
Inc. to such a degree that J.J. Johnson & 
Associates, Inc. had become a mere instrumentality 
of Sear-Brown. 
2. That Sear-Brown stripped J.J. Johnson & 
Associates, Inc. of its assets. 
3. That this created an unjust loss or injury to 
plaintiffs by making J.J. Johnson & Associates, 
Inc. insolvent. 
Yes 
No 
A 
DATED this n ^ day of October, 1993 
JM^^^/Z^L 
Foreperson 
Special Interrogatory 
Was it shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
J. J. Johnson & Associates was the alter ego of Sear-Brown and 
that observation of the corporate distinction between J. J. 
Johnson & Associates and Sear-Brown would sanction a fraud, or 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity? 
Yes 
No * 
DATED this # - day of October, 1993 
Foreperson 
Special Interrogatory 7 
Please answer the following questions based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, unless otherwise indicated. If 
you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue 
presented, answer "Yes.11 If you find the evidence is so equally 
balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the 
evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates against 
the issue presented, answer "No." 
Taking into consideration all the evidence in this 
case, which if any, of the following propositions have been 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence? If a matter has been 
proven, answer "Yes," if it has not been proven, answer "No." 
a) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates 
owned all or most of the capital stock of J. J. 
Johnson. 
Yes: £± N o : 
b) The Sear-Brown Group or Sear-Brown Associates 
employed common directors or officers with J. J. 
Johnson. 
Yes: X No: 
c) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates 
financed J. J. Johnson. 
Yes: /^ No: 
d) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates 
created or caused the incorporation of J. J. Johnson. 
Yes: No: /\ 
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e) J. J. Johnson had grossly inadequate capital during 
its affiliation with the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-
Brown Associates. 
Yes: /\. No: 
f) The Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates 
paid the salaries and other expenses or losses of J. J. 
Johnson. 
Yes: No: /X 
g) J. J. Johnson had substantially no business except 
with the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates 
or no assets except those conveyed to it by the Sear-
Brown Group and/or Sear-Brown Associates. 
Yes: No: £± 
h) In the papers of the Sear-Brown Group and/or Sear-
Brown Associates, J. J. Johnson was described as a 
department or division of the Sear-Brown Group and/or 
Sear-Brown Associates. 
Yes: No: ^ 
i) The directors and executives of J. J. Johnson did 
not act independently in the interest of J. J. Johnson 
but took their orders from the Sear-Brown Group and/or 
Sear-Brown Associates* 
Yes: No: /_ 
00826 
j) The formal legal requirements of J. J. Johnson were 
not observed. 
Yes: ft Mtf No: 
!(4 
DATED this 8 ^ day of October, 1993. 
Foreperson 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review.—The Doctrine of Part CJS. — 61 CJS. Specific Performance 
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Con- | | 44, 45. 
tract* in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91. Key Number*. — Specific Performance e» 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Per- 39 et esq. 
formance ft 19, 20. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter to be subscribed 
by any party may be subscribed by the lawful agent of such party. 
History: R.S. 1898 * CX. 1907, I S478; 
CJL 1917, I 5825; R.S. 1933 A C. 1943, 
33-5-9. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Authorization from only one joint tenant nor given written authority to agent to sign for 
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint her. William* v. Singleton, 723 P26 421 (Utah 
tenant, by contract to purchase the common 1986). 
property since she had not signed the contract 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of e» 
Frauds § 379 et aeq. 116(1). 
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25*6-1. Short title. 
This chapter ia known aa the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act." 
History: C. 1953, 25A-M, enacted by L. Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Okie-
19S8, eh. 69, I 1; recompiled aa C. 1953, home, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
2S-6-1. Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. 
Comparable Provisions. — Other juhsdic- Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was edi-
tions thst hsve adopted the Uniform Fraudu- acted as if 25A-1*1 to 25A-1-13; it has been 
lent Transfer Act include: Arkansas, Califor- renumbered and all internal references cor-
nia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, rected accordingly under instruction from the 
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Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Effective Datee. — Laws 1986. Chapter 59 
became effective on April 25,1966, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Croes-References. — Uniform Commercial 
Code — Sales, I 70A-2-101 et eeq. 
25*6*2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with 
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the 
debtor, other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to 
vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the 
power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securi-
ties are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to 
vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, con-
trols, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding 
voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the 
securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the secu-
rities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the 
power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease 
or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are 
controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or 
other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbank-
ruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the 
extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against 
only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who i§ liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor, 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
Uniform Commercial Code — Bulk Trans-
fers, I 70A-6-101 et eeq. 
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor, 
I 764-511. 
Statute of limitations, f 7S-12-26X3). 
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(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(a)(ii); or 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or 
person in control; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor, 
(ii) an officer of the debtor, 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(b)(iv); or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person 
in control of the debtor, 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor, 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a 
person in control of the debtor, 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general part-
ner; 
(iv) a genera] partner in a partnership described in Subsection 
(7)(c)(iii); or 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were 
the debtor; and 
(e) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure 
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security 
interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equita-
ble process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, 
business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a 
spouse, related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined 
by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adop-
tive relationship within the third degree. 
(12) 'Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an 
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, 
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a 
judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or pro-
ceedings. 
Hiitory: C. 1953, 25A1-2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Lews 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, f 2; recompiled at C. 1953, became effective on April 25,19SS, pursuant to 
25-6*2. Utah Const., An. VI, Sec. 25. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Creditors. 
Construction tad application. 
latent. 
Creditor*. 
Persons having claim in tort against grantor 
which was not reduced to judgment at time of 
alleged fraudulent conveyance held "creditor" 
within meaning of this taction. Zuniga v. 
Evans, 87 Utah 198, 46 PM 513, 101 AJLR. 
532 (1935). 
Construction and application. 
This section should be construed with liber-
ality to as to reach all artifices and evasions 
designed to rob the act of it* full force and ef-
fect in preventing debtors from paying the just 
claims of their creditors. Butler v. Wilkinson, 
740 ?M 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Intent 
Where debtort engaged in a Pouri scheme, 
the debtors' fraudulent intent was established 
as a matter of law, notwithstanding the bank-
ruptcy trustee'! burden of proving each ele-
ment of a fraudulent conveyance by clear and 
convincing evidence under this chapter. Mer 
rill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing 
House Co.), 77 Bankr 843 CD. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Bankrupt's 
Spouse: The Forgotten Character in the Bank* 
ruptcy Drams, 1974 Utah L Rev. 709, 722. 
AJLR. — Future tort, conveyance as fraudu-
lent where made in contemplation of possible 
liability for, 38 A.L.R3d 597. 
Rule denying recovery of property to one who 
conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable 
where the claim which motivated the convey-
ance was never established, 6 AXJt4th 862. 
Right of secured creditor to have eet aside 
fraudulent transfer of other property by his 
debtor, 8 A.L.R 4th 1123. 
Conspiracy, right of creditor to receiver dam-
ages for conspiracy to defraud him of claim, 11 
AXJUth 345. 
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
e»6. 
25*6*3. Insolvency. 
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all 
of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is 
presumed to be insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the part-
nership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the 
partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each general 
partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been trans-
ferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors 
or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under 
this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is 
secured by a valid lien on property of* the debtor not included as an asset. 
History: C. 1*53, ISA- l* enacted by L. 
IMS, ch. 69, I 3; recompiled at C. 1963, 
25*3 . 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art VI, Sac 25. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ineolvency inthebaiikniptcyeenae,ejthiseec-
. . . tion require* merely a showing that the party's 
Allegation oT insolvency
 l i i t t I ^ ^ ^ ^ t to mmt u&Qton „ 
Determination of insolvency. ^ y
 hmam d u e M f y t r v 0 f | | t r i l ^ ^ ^ 
Allegation of insolvency. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an In an action by a creditor to set aside an 
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real estate 
at against contention that it was a conclusion, by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate 
Zumgs v Evans, 87 Utah 198.48 ?M 513,101 that the debtor was insolvent where the only 
AJLR. 532 (1935) evidence was that the debtor submitted two 
Determination of insolvency. checks that were returned unpaid Furniture 
The determination of insolvency under this Mfri Sales, Inc. v. Oeamer, 680 PJd 898 
eection is not the same as the determination of (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Imputation of insolvency as de* Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
fematory, 49 AX.R.3d 163. e» 67(1). 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured 
or satisfied However, value does not include an unperformed promise made 
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support 
to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a rea-
sonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an 
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or exe-
cution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the 
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor 
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in (act 
substantially contemporaneous. 
History C. 1953, 25A1-4, enacted by 1* Effective Dates. — Laws 1986, Chanter 59 
1986, ch. 59, f 44 recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on Ann) 25,1988, pursuant to 
85*4. Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25. 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or af-
ter transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or in-
curred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
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(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transac-
tion for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably 
small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have be-
lieved that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they 
became due. 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may 
be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred 
after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor 
had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(0 the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reason-
ably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the 
obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the trans-
fer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial 
debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a 
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L. became effective on April 25,1968, pursuant to 
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25 
25-6-5. Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 as a misdemeanor, f 76-6-511. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Whether an assignment of an interest in an 
A estate was in good faith and not to hinder, dc-
Assignments
 U y o r d e f r a u d creditors, or was made for such 
Badges of fraud^ purpose, depends upon the facts and circum-
Construction and application. £ ^ surrounding the transaction, as gath-
Constructive trust •• EvIdewT0" ^^^ ^tWtB' Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 
ered from the badges of fraud present. 
l i 
(1942). Fair consideration. 
-Good faith" transfer. Badges of fraud. 
Mortgagor remaining in possession. Although actual fraudulent intent must be 
Parent and child. shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its ex-
AssignmenU. iatence may be inferred from the pitsence of 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, un- eeruin indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud w 
accompanied by change of possession, is fraud- Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 
ulent per se as to execution creditors of, or sub* (Utah 1986). 
aequent purchasers from, seller or assignor "Badges of fraud," from which actual intent 
does not necessarily apply to assignments for may be inferred, include, inter aha. a debtors 
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking (1) continuing in possession and evidencing the 
possession is circumstance from which fraud prerequisites of property ownership after hav-
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. Mur- ing formally conveyed all his interest in the 
dock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899). property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-
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tion of litigation, and (3) making a conveyance 
to a family member without receiving fair con-
sideration Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 
?2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
Construction and application. 
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor 
from paying or securing his honest debts, or 
from doing equity and exact justice to all of his 
creditors by placing his means at their die-
posal Billing! v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P. 
730 (1898). 
Constructive trust 
A constructive trust was properly imposed to 
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds 
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land, 
which were in excess of the purchase pnce, had 
been paid into court, and a subsequent convey* 
ance to a third-party purchaser for value with* 
out notice could not be voided Butler v. Wilk-
inson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Conveyances between relatives. 
Conveyances between near relatives, calcu-
lated to prevent a creditor from realizing on his 
claim against one of such relatives, are subject 
to rigid scrutiny Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 
540, 15 P2d 1051 (1932) 
The mere fact that the transaction is among 
close relatives does not necessarily mean that 
it is invalid, but the true facts are subject to 
proof Given v Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 
P2d 959 (1960) 
A note and mortgage executed by eon in good 
faith to secure a preexisting obligation which 
the son owed his father was not a fraudulent 
conveyance Ned J Bowman Co v White, 13 
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962) 
Conveyances between close relatives are 
subject to ngid scrutin>, but the fact that close 
relatives are involved does not render the con-
veyance fraudulent Ned J Bowman Co v. 
Whit*, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
Evidence. 
Whether an assignment of an interest in an 
estate «as in good faith and not to hinder, de-
lay or defraud creditors depends upon the facta 
and circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion, as gathered from the badges of fraud 
present Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 
P.2d 1063 (1942) 
In an action on notes executed by the defen-
dants and to establish a lien on property con-
veyed by one of the defendants to his children, 
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the lower 
court's findings that the conveyances were not 
fraudulent and to sustain a judgment denying 
a hen Given v Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,351 
P.2d 959 (1960) 
Whether a conveyance M fraudulent aa to 
creditors must be determined from the facta of 
etch case and from the arcumstanees sur-
rounding the transaction, keeping in mind that 
the purpose of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(now ate the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act) is not to prevent a debtor from aacunng 
his honest debt. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 
13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
Fair ooneideratiozL 
Where there ia a valuable oonaideration 
which is stated to be fair, equivalent for, and 
not disproportionate to the value of the prop-
erty conveyed, the requirement aa to allega-
tions and proof of fraud is more exacting. 
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244,17 ?M 264 
(1932). 
Where wife owned a substantial interest in a 
Joint bank account and husband executed a 
note to the wife at her request upon withdraw-
ing a substantial sum from such account to in-
vest in a hazardous business, and whan it be-
came due, husband executed renewal note se-
cured by mortgage on undivided one-half inter-
est in property owned by them jointly, the orig-
inal interest note was supported by valuable 
oonaideration, and, hence, the mortgage waa 
sot fraudulent as to creditors Williams v. Ft-
tenon, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935). 
Conveyance of property worth $14,000 to 
815,000, which netted only about $180 a year, 
to party in aatiafaction of preexisting debt of 
$10,000 was not a fraudulent conveyance. 
Utah Assets Corp v. Dooley Bros. Aae'n, 92 
Utah 577, 70 PJM 738 (1937). 
A debt barred by the statute of limitations 
may nevertheless be oonaideration for the as-
signment of an interest in an estate, even aa 
between close relatives Boccalero v. Bee, 102 
Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942). 
In suit to aet aaide conveyance from husband 
to wife, no actual fraudulent intent will be re-
quired, when there was no fair value or consid-
eration given, and the effect of the transfer is 
to render the grantor insolvent Cardonv Har-
per, 106 Utah 560,151 ?M 99,154 AXJI 906 
(1944). 
A conveyance was not made in good faith, 
and there was a failure of fair consideration, 
where purchaser knew that the purchase price 
of an item was approximately only one-tenth 
the value of the item Meyer v General Am. 
Corp, 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
Satisfaction of an obligation owed the trans-
feree by a third party did not qualify as fair 
consideration under former I 25-1-4. 
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 
(Utah 1966). 
An otherwise fraudulent tranafer ia not 
made nonfraudulent because transfer is made 
to satisfy a third party's obligation to the 
transferee even if the thirty party ia a corpora-
tion aet up by the transferor Dahnken, Inc. v. 
Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
"Good faith" transfer. 
Proof that a transferee of property knows 
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that the transferor-debtor has preferred the was not to be paid on ita due date but waa to be 
transferee over other creditors or that the extended from time to time McKibbon v. Brig-
transferee actively sought the preference from ham, 18 Utah 78, 55 P. 66 (1898). 
the debtor does not support the conclusion that 
the transferee lacks good faith under former Parent and child. 
I 25-1*7. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 Labor performed for parents by children dur-
(Utah 1987). ing their minority will not entitle such chil-
Mortgagor remaining in possession. d r t n *° «>ap*&**tion, so as to establish rela-
Mortgage on stock of merchandise was tion of debtor and creditor asid permit parenu 
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of mort- lawfully to prefer children, o>nvey their prop-
gagor, where mortgagor remained in posses- t r t v *° t i l fm» and thus plans property out of 
sion of mortgaged property and continued to reach of parents' creditors whose claims were 
sell it in usual course of business pursuant to "> existence at time of deed's execution. Ogden 
merely verbal agreement with mortgagee, State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765 
which agreement contemplated that mortgage (1895). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AJLR. — Future tort, conveyance as fraudu- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
lent where made in contemplation of possible e» 24(2), 71, 76(1). 
liability for, 38 A.L.R.3d 597. 
25-6-6. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before trans-
fer. 
(DA transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without 
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at the time; or 
(b) the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation. 
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim 
arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for 
an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had 
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 
History: C. 1953, 23A1-6, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 69, I 6; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1968, pursuant to 
25-6-6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Mortgage. tenet of a subjective intention to defraud if not 
A mortgage made without fair consideration, required. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 
which will render the person making it ineol- Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962). 
vent, constitutes statutory fraud, and the axis-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
e» 74(1). 
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25-6-7. Transfer — When made. 
In this chapter: 
(1) A transfer is made: 
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fix-
ture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a con-
tract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected 
that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against 
whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot ac-
quire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the 
transferee; and 
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a 
fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a 
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien other than under this 
chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in 
Subsection (1) and the transfer i§ not so perfected before the commence-
ment of an action for relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed 
made immediately before the commencement of the action. 
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as 
provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective 
between the debtor and the transferee. 
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the 
asset transferred. 
(5) An obligation is incurred: 
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or 
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the 
obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee. 
Hiftoiy: C. 1953, 25A1-7, enacted by L. became tfltctive on April 25,19S6, pursuant to 
1988, cb. 59, I 7; recompiled a* C. 1953, Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-7. Croat-References. — Secured transactions, 
Effective Datea. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 Chapter 9 of Title 70A. 
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors. 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chap-
ter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to 
satisfy the creditor's claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset trans-
ferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the proce-
dure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with 
applicable rules of civil procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a 
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset trans-
ferred or of other property of the transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the 
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its 
proceeds. 
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History: C. 1953, 25A14, enacted by L. 
IMS, ch. 6t\ t 6; recompiled as C. 1963, 
18*64. 
Effective Dates. — Uwi 1968, Chapter 59 
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Garnishment proceeding. 
Pleadings. 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Garnishment proceeding. 
Fact that pleadings in garnishment proceed-
ings revealed that indebtedness sued upon was 
that of individuals and that those individuals 
had no account with garnishee bank, the only 
account being with corporation owned by indi-
viduals, did not make cause of action one, un-
der this section, to set aside conveyance, and 
thus argument that court had never obtained 
jurisdiction of corporate defendant or of res 
since no service of summons was made upon 
corporation could not be maintained; the plead-
ing sufficiently averred a sham transaction be-
tween the individuals and the corporation so 
that they should be considered as identical for 
purpose of garnishment proceedings. Stine v. 
Girola, 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959). 
Transfer of stock could be set aside as a 
fraudulent conveyance on motion in garnish-
ment proceeding, and it was not necessary to 
file a separate action to obtain such relief. 
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,519 P.2d 236 
(1974). 
Pleadings. 
Allegations in an action to set aside convey-
ances that the conveyances were made for the 
purpose of placing the property beyond the 
reach of creditors and were made as part of a 
scheme, without s statement of the facta from 
which the purpose could be inferred, and with-
out stating facts constituting the scheme, 
amounted to no more than the mere statement 
that the conveyances were fraudulent. Smith 
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932). 
Complaint in an action to set aside a convey-
ance was not objectionable for failure to allege 
that the property involved in the conveyance 
was not exempt. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 
48 P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 532 (1935). 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Where grantees were in possession of prem-
ises pursuant to a duly recorded deed and were 
paying taxes thereon, it was incumbent upon 
plaintiffs, in an action to set aside conveyance, 
to allege and prove that grantees as such did 
certain acts held themselves out in s way that 
misled plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had knowl-
edge and relied thereon. Smith v. Edwards, 81 
Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932). 
Burden of proof is not on plaintiff to show 
that property alleged to have been fraudu-
lently conveyed is not exempt from execution. 
Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560,151 P.2d 99, 
154 A.L.R. 906 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
e» 217, 226 et aeq. 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a) 
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value 
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is 
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the creditor 
may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted, under 
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, which-
ever is less. The judgment may be entered against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the 
transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who 
took for value or from any subsequent transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset 
transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the 
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asset at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may 
require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this 
chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the 
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Kb) or Section 
25-6-6 if the transfer results from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termina-
tion is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Chapter 9, 
Title 70A, the Uniform Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the 
debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a 
valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business of financial affairs of the 
debtor and the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and 
the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an 
antecedent debt of the debtor. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-19, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Lsws 1988, Chapter 59 
1986, ch. 59, I 9; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1986, pursuant to 
254-9. Utah Coast., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Consideration 
Constructive trust 
Good faith 
Previous notice of fraud. 
Purchaser. 
Consideration. 
The term "consideration" as used in former 
I 251*13 includes both a conveyance of "prop-
erty" and satisfaction of an antecedent debt. 
Merrill v Abbott (In re Independent Clearing 
House Co), 77 Bankr 843 (D Utah 1967). 
An investor in a Ponu scheme fave "valu-
able consideration" for the transfers he re-
ceived to the extent the transfers did not ex-
ceed his undertaking, but did not give valuable 
consideration for a tnntftr to the extent the 
transfer exceeded the amount of his undertak-
ing Therefore, for such transfers, former 
I 25-1-13 was no defense Merrill v. Abbott (In 
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr. 
843 (D Utah 1987). 
Constructive trust 
A constructive trust was properly imposed to 
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds 
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land, 
which were in excess of the purchase price, had 
been paid into court, and a subsequent convey-
ance to a third-party purchaser for value with-
out notice could not be voided Butler v. Wilk-
inson, 740 ?2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Good faith. 
A conveyance will fail for lack of "fair con-
eideration" if the party seeking to avoid the 
conveyance can ahow that the transferee did 
not take "in good faith * Merrill v. Abbott (In 
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr. 
843 (D. Utah 1987). 
Previous notice of fraud. 
The mere fact that an investment promises 
to pay a high rate of return may not, without 
more, put one on notice that it i$ fraudulent. 
Therefore, that fact alone may not mean that 
the investors in a Ponxi scheme had previous 
notice of the debtors' fraud, especially when 
the debtors actually paid the promised returns 
until the scheme collapsed Merrill v. Abbott 
(In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 
Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1967). 
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Purchaser. property through a voluntary transfer Memll 
The term •'purchaser* at used in former v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing Houae 
I 25-1-13 includes anyone who acquire* title to Co.), 77 Bankr. $43 (D. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Number*. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
e» 192. 
25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits. 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent transfer or 
obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years after the transfer 
was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after 
the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered 
by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6*5(1 Kb) or 25-6-6(1), within four years after 
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or 
^ ^ (3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after the transfer was 
i^^nade or the obligation was incurred. 
History. C. 1953, 25A-M0, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1968, Chapter 59 
1988, eh. 59, i 10; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
254-10. Utah Const., ArL VI, Sec. 25 
25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including 
merchant law and the law relating to pnncipal and agent, equitable subordi-
nation, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, 
insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement this chap-
ter's provisions. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-M1, enacted by L. Effective Date*. — Lewi 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, cb- 59, I 11; recompiled aa C. 1953, became effective on Apnl 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-11. Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25*6-12. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose 
to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among 
states enacting it. 
History. C. 1953, 25A-M2, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1968, eh. 69, I 12; recompiled aa C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
254-12. Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
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25-6-13** Applicability of chapter. 
This met applies when'any transfer occurs after the effective date of this act 
History: C. IMS, 25A-M3, enacted by L. 7*42-29, end which was afieetfo April 25, 
1SSS, ch. 59, I IS; racompflad as C. 1*53, 193S. The rsfsrsnes probably thould bt to this 
2&4-13. chaptar" 
Compiler's Notes. — Tht tsnn this act" Effective Data*. — Laws 19SS, Chaptar 59 
man* Laws 19S6, Chaptar 59, which appsars became affactivs on April 25,19SS, pursuant to 
as If 25-6-1 to 25-6*13, 7S-12-25, and Utah Const, Art VL Sac. 25. 
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